What does the composition of the “new” government tell us? That the situation won’t get any better. Outwardly everything will look just as it did, but to all intents and purposes things will be much worse. Objectively this is because the economy is in decline. Subjectively, this is due to the fact that neither Dmitry Medvedev nor his deputies don’t know what to do in the current circumstances. And they don’t want to. They don’t care.

THERE WILL BE NO “NEW” PUTIN

The key conclusion to be drawn from the formation of the government is that the situation in the country won’t improve. The rejection of any change is emphasised and blown out of all proportion. The minor reshuffle only reinforced the impression of odious despair: Vitaly Mutko will now head construction, Patrushev Junior [son of Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation] will become Minister of Agriculture, while Alexei Kudrin will chair the Audit Chamber. It is boring even to write about all this.

However, there was no possible alternative – as there isn’t and will never be a different or “new” Putin. There will be neither Putin 4.0 nor Putin 5.0. The reappointed President does not have any new ideas and proposals. He has no programme for modernising the country. He has no vision for the future. He doesn’t even have an action programme. Only a set of declarations bereft of any real substance – he simply announced a “wish list”.

The gist of Putin’s recent speeches – both before the presidential campaign and during the campaign, including the December “televised direct line” and the March address to the Federal Assembly – represents a fundamental refusal to change political course and implement any reasonable and necessary reforms. Therefore, the arrangement of musicians in the four-piece band does not matter, as in Ivan Krylov’s famous fable [“The Quartet”].

The “breakthroughs” mentioned by the new-old President while maintaining the current political course would only be possible if the repressive component of the regime were to be abandoned. And Prime Minister Medvedev is perfect here. He faithfully served the system in his role both before and after 2012. Protecting Putin, he publicly announced the key motto of today: “We have no money, but just hold on”. Medvedev deserved it.

And the system has now reached the state where there is no longer a “technical” government or even decorative parliament any more: the ministers and deputies (all of them, including the so-called “parliamentary opposition”) represent an organic part of a single authoritarian-bureaucratic system. This is called the “nomenclature”. Whether as deputies, or governors, or ministers – they will come in handy everywhere as Putin’s universal soldiers. It goes without saying that there will be personnel changes. Dismissals are an effective resource: hated “boyars” and “government officials” will be cast off the Kremlin porch when social tension increases.

What is the criterion for selecting members of the cabinet and what is the logic of such appointments? There is only one criterion for selecting ministers: personal loyalty.  And the logic of the appointments aims to ensure the endless retention of power.

CONTROL AND CARVE-UP

When it comes to the Russian economy, economic policy (and this is exactly what a government is expected to do) has contracted to the maximum. Now economic policy in Russia means only the oil prices, taxes and other charges on the population, the financing of the arms race and various military escapades (like Syria and Donbass), and also cunning social hand-outs against the backdrop of falling incomes. In other words modern economic policy involves finding ways to wring money from the population and allocate it for the goals of the regime. And naturally, where possible a ‘carve-up” of any available funds.

The meaning of the “reshuffle” of deputy prime ministers in the “new” government is precisely to ensure that the right people are in place to carry out this ingenuous list of tasks. The main function of deputy prime ministers is to allocate budget funds at a time of economic stagnation and sanctions. As the Russian government cannot influence oil prices or sanctions, the purpose of its work is to increase the financial pressure on the population. The idea of increasing personal income tax has already been proposed and is being tested. The depreciation of the rouble and decline in real earnings – such a development is perceived as an opportunity to replenish the treasury. The decision to increase the retirement age has to all intentions already been adopted. Taxes on e-Commerce, tyres, shoes, real estate, barns, baths, toilets will be raised, Tariffs for housing and utilities services, etc., will increase, indefinitely… And what’s more we will witness another redistribution in the extractive industry.

The formation of the government is merely a fight for control over budget funds. One such example of covert intrigue was the leak of information on the vacation of the now former Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on Oleg Deripaska’s yacht.

SIGNALS AND MESSAGES

The new government is also notable for pivotal ideological appointments. The defiant retention of Vladimir Medinsky as Minister of Culture is a message to the humanitarian community and intelligentsia. Meanwhile the appointment of the head of the Federal Agency of Scientific Organisations (the federal authority that has been most proactive in destroying the Russian Academy of Sciences) as Minister of Science and Higher Education is a message to all our academics and each academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences personally.

The retention of Ministers Sergey Lavrov and Sergey Shoigu is also notable. Their ministries have become symbols of the isolationist aggressive foreign policy and militarisation of life in the country and public consciousness. Lavrov is like Medinsky one of the key propagandists in the country. A diplomat as a propagandist is an important element of the system. However, if this is a return to the Soviet era, it is not to Andrei Gromyko, known as “Mr No”, but instead to Mr “Stone Arse” – Vyacheslav Molotov.

Sergey Shoigu also remained in place, despite all his obvious failures, such as the February incident at Deir ez-Zor in Syria when Russian mercenaries were killed. The system that has backed war is becoming increasingly dependent on the people responsible for the fighting. And this means not only the Ministry of Defence, but also the individuals actually commanding these mercenaries (see the article “Hybrid Danger” published in February 2018). Incidentally, we see the same story on the international scene, with Bashar al-Assad and the Iranians: Russia finds itself dependent on its Middle Eastern “allies”, and our country’s prospects arising from development of this dependence are not at all good (see the article “The Iranian Trap” from May 2018). Therefore, if the policy does not change, there is no room for any reshuffles either in the Ministry of Defence or in the government in general, and there are also no chances to rectify the state of affairs in the country in general.

VOTING AGAINST ANY CHANGE FOR THE BETTER

In general, the formation of the government means the completion of the March plebiscite, rather than elections implying a certain level of renewal to factor in the results of the vote, even in the case of victory of the current regime. This is specifically a plebiscite triumphantly supporting the status quo of the powers that be, the policies of the past decade and Vladimir Putin personally. A plebiscite of love for the leader does not imply any change. Everything will remain the same: poverty, corruption, backwardness, war, lies and disrespect… So to all intents and purposes everyone lost, including all the people who voted for Putin, and also who abstained. The only winners were the absolute minority who have been feeding off Putin’s system all these years (see the article “The Elections Were Won by the Overwhelming Minority” published in March 2018). And now the regime in the interests of this absolute minority has formed a government that will grind down the country and the citizens who lost. This is the harsh reality facing everyone. This is the result of Putin’s victory on 18 March this year.

This should have been opposed by fighting for a transformation of the plebiscite into real elections, and by grasping at all the opportunities provided by the Constitution and the intention of the system to observe the constitution albeit formally and only partly. Was there any chance? Probably. However, to disregard elections and then discuss the possibility of change is just absurd and indicative of what Putin is imposing on society. The “elections” are over. What is driving the hope for change in the public opinion polls? Whom do 59% of the population expecting change want to see as head of the government? Igor Sechin?